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Résumé
Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à la modélisation
de l’utilité des informations. Plus précisément, nous visons
à caractériser ce qu’est, pour un agent cognitif qui a des
croyances et des buts, une information utile ou à quel de-
gré une information lui est utile. Nous présentons trois mo-
dèles différents et nous prenons la Recherche d’Informa-
tion comme domaine applicatif en comparant les mesures
existantes avec une mesure d’utilité définie ici.
Mots Clef
Utilité, agent cognitif, buts, croyances.
Abstract
This paper focuses on modelling information usefulness.
More precisely, it aims at characterizing how useful a piece
of information is for a cognitive agent which has some
beliefs and goals. The paper presents three different ap-
proaches. We take Information Retrieval as a particular
applicative domain and we compare some existing mea-
sures with the usefulness measure introduced here.
Keywords
Usefulness, cognitive agent, beliefs, goals.
1 Introduction
Usefulness is a ubiquitous notion. For instance, in Data
Mining, evaluating the interest of the extracted knowledge
is necessary [FSP+14] ; in Natural Language Processing,
identifying useful terminology [ZPM18] is a prerequisite
to any analysis. In Social Science, studying how people
achieve effective conversational communication in com-
mon social situations is needed. There, Grice [Gri75], in-
troduced the maxim of quantity which emphasizes the fact
that a speaker contribution must be as informative as re-
quired for the current purposes of the exchange, but not
more informative. In Database domain, taking the goals
and the preferences of the user who asks a query is ne-
cessary for generating cooperative answers [Min98]. In
Information Retrieval (IR), the aim is to take into ac-
count a query expressed by a user and provide documents
which best suit the user need i.e., which are the most use-
ful ones. Initially, the topical relevance approach conside-
red that relevant documents are those whose topics best
match the topics of the user query [HS13]. This led to
the aboutness measure. Then, other dimensions have been
considered : coverage, which measures how strongly the
user interests are included in a document [PBV07] ; ap-
propriateness, which measures how seemly a document
is with respect to the user interests [dCPDP09] ; and no-
velty, which measures how novel is the document with res-
pect to what the system has already proposed to the user
[CKC+08]. However, the user who asks a query is a cogni-
tive agent [RG91, dCMLVC98] : he/she has some goals to
achieve and he/she has some beliefs about the world. Mo-
reover, these beliefs are generally incomplete and the user
asks queries to the system in order to get new information
which will help him/her achieve his/her goals.
In the present work, we consider a general framework in
which there are two cognitive agents : one is the user who
has some beliefs and some goals modelled as propositional
formulas ; the second is the system. This latter has some
beliefs about the user’s beliefs and goals. Its goal is to pro-
vide the user with information which is the most useful for
him/her to achieve his/her own goals. This framework is
general enough to model the paradigm of cooperative ex-
changes with a system (a speaker, a database, the search en-
gine) who answers the query expressed by the user (the lis-
tener, the database user, the web user. . .) in which the sys-
tem has to provide the most useful information to the user.
Defining the concept of information usefulness in such a
context is the main aim of this paper. More precisely, we
take the system point of view and try to characterize how
useful a piece of information can be for the user.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give
some preliminaries and state our working hypotheses. In
Sections 3, 4, 5 we propose three different definitions of
information usefulness, respectively called binary, ordinal
and numerical. In Section 6, we consider the particular case
of Information Retrieval and compares some measures de-
fined there with ours. Some concluding remarks are given
in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a propositional language L of which a subset,
LG, is the language used to represent the goals. We consi-
der an agent a with a goal set Ga, which is a finite set of
positive literals from LG. For example, finish the state of
the art of my article, prepare for Monday’s class. Moreo-
ver, agent a has a belief base Ba composed of two subsets
Bma and B
g
a . B
m
a is the set of formulas from L \LG which
represents a’s beliefs. For example, I know modal logic and
I know the Python language.Bga contains as many formulas
l1G ∧ . . . ∧ lmGG → G, where each liG is a positive literal of
L \ LG, as there are G ∈ Ga. Such formulas represent the
beliefs of a about what is needed to achieve its goals. For
example, to finish the state of the art (G) I need knowledge
about modal logic (p) and BDI agents (q) (i.e., p∧q → G).
The conjunction l1G ∧ .. ∧ lmGG is called premise of G and
it is noted premise(G). Notice that, according to the pre-
vious assumptions, we consider that the agent knows how
to achieve its goals (in Ga)—the agent knows which are
the pieces of information it needs to achieve its goals. This
amounts to discarding the goals the agent does not know
how to achieve.
Definition 1 Let C and C ′ be two conjunctions of literals.
C is included in C ′, noted C ⊆ C ′, iff all the literals of C
are literals of C ′. C is equal to C ′, noted C = C ′, iff the
literals of C are exactly the same as the literals of C ′.
Definition 2 Let S and S′ be two sets of conjunctions of
positive literals. S 1 S′ iff (i) |S| ≤ |S′| and (ii) if |S| =
|S′| then there is a bijection f : S → S′ such that : ∀ψ ∈
S ψ ⊆ f(ψ). S ≺1 S′ iff S 1 S′ and S′ 61 S.
Definition 3 Let S and S′ be two sets of conjunctions of
positive literals. S 2 S′ iff (i) |S| ≤ |S′| and (ii) if |S| =
|S′| then there is a bijection f : S → S′ such that : ∀ψ ∈
S |ψ| ≤ |f(ψ)|. S ≺2 S′ iff S 2 S′ and S′ 62 S.
Thus S 1 S′ (resp., S 2 S′) iff S does not have more
elements than S′ ; if S and S′ have the same number of
elements, then the conjunctions in S are included in the
conjunctions of S′ (resp., are shorter than those of S′). No-
tice that 1 is a preorder but it is not total. Some sets of
conjunctions are incomparable, such as {p, q∧r} 61 {r, s}
and {r, s} 61 {p, q ∧ r}. 2 is a total preorder.
Definition 4 (Missing Information) Let a be an agent
with its belief base Ba and its goal set Ga. Let G ∈ Ga
be such that Ba 6|= G. Missing(Ba, G), is defined as fol-
lows :
Missing(Ba, G) =
∧
l:l∈premise(G) and Ba 6|=l
l
Missing(Ba, G) is the conjunction of all the literals in
the premise of G which cannot be deduced from Ba (i.e.,
which are not yet believed by the agent). Therefore, in the
particular case in which Bma = ∅, Missing(Ba, G) =
premise(G), i.e., the missing piece of information to
achieve G is premise(G).
Notice that the notion of missing information is defined
only for the goals that are not already achieved (i.e, goals
such that Ba 6|= G). A missing information associated to a
goal is then the conjunction of all the literals representing
the information need to achieve that goal (not yet achie-
ved), and only these ones. Moreover, we would like to
stress that, according to Definition 4, the formula whose
conclusion is G can be written as : Missing(Ba, G) ∧
ψBa,G → G with ψBa,G ∈ L \ LG, Ba |= ψBa,G and
Ba 6|= Missing(Ba, G).
Proposition 1 1
— Let ϕ ∈ L\LG be a formula andG ∈ Ga be a goal
of agent a. We have that Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,G) ⊆
Missing(Ba, G).
— If ψ |= ϕ then Missing(Ba ∪ ψ,G) ⊆
Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,G).
— Let ϕ1 ∈ L \ LG, ϕ2 ∈ L \ LG be two formulas
and G ∈ Ga be a goal of agent a. We have that
Missing(Ba ∪ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), G) = Missing((Ba ∪
ϕ1) ∪ ϕ2), G).
Definition 5 (Multiset of missing information)
Let a be an agent whose belief base is Ba and whose
goal set is Ga. The multiset 2 of missing information
to achieve the goals in Ga is : Missing(Ba, Ga) =
{Missing(Ba, G1), . . . ,Missing(Ba, Gk)} with
{G1, . . . , Gk} = {Gi ∈ Ga and Ba 6|= Gi}.
There is therefore as much missing information as there are
unachieved goals, i.e., the cardinality ofMissing(Ba, Ga)
corresponds to the number of goals that are not yet achie-
ved.
Example 1 Let us consider a propositional language
whose letters are : p, q, r, G1 and G2 respectively mea-
ning “I know the main papers about modal logic”, “I know
the main papers about BDI agents”, “I know the Python
language”, “I can start writing the state of the art” and
“My Monday’s class is prepared”. Let us consider Ga =
{G1, G2} andBa = {p}∪{p∧q → G1, r → G2}. We have
that, Missing(Ba, G1) = q, Missing(Ba, G2) = r and
therefore, Missing(Ba, Ga) = {q, r}. This means that, in
order to achieve its goals, the agent lacks knowledge about
BDI agents and about the Python language.
The following proposition shows that adding a belief to the
belief base Ba does not increase the number of missing
conjunctions. Moreover, if this does not reduce it either,
then it does not increase their size. Finally, if adding a be-
lief to the belief base Ba reduces the number of missing
conjunctions, then this means that such new belief allows
to achieve one or more goals.
Proposition 2 For all formula (piece of information) ϕ ∈
L \ LG, we have :
— |Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga)| ≤ |Missing(Ba, Ga)|.
— ∀ϕ if |Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga)| =
|Missing(Ba, Ga)| then there is a bijection
f : Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga) → Missing(Ba, Ga)
such that ∀ψ ∈Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga) ψ ⊆ f(ψ).
1. Proofs are omitted due to length limitation
2. Reminder : a multiset is a set whose elements can have several
occurrences, such as {p, q, p}.
— If |Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga)| < |Missing(Ba, Ga)|
then ∃Gi ∈ Ga such that Missing(Ba, Gi) ∈
Missing(Ba, Ga) and Ba ∪ ϕ |= Gi.
3 A Binary Approach
In this section, we characterize useful information for an
agent in view of achieving its goals in two different ways.
According to this binary approach, a piece of information
is useful or not.
Definition 6 Let a be an agent with its belief base Ba and
its set of goals Ga. Formula ϕ ∈ L \ LG is U1-useful for
agent a iff Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga) ≺1 Missing(Ba, Ga).
We use the notation U1Ga,Baϕ or, more simply, U
1ϕ, when
there is no ambiguity.
According to this definition, a formula ϕ in L \ LG is use-
ful for a in view of achieving its goals Ga iff being aware
of ϕ allows a to reduce its information need either by re-
ducing the number of missing conjunctions or by simpli-
fying them. Restricting useful information to formulas of
L \ LG only amounts (i) to restricting to information the
agent must acquire in order to achieve its goals and (ii) to
rule out the fact that a goal can be achieved by a other than
through the acquisition of information recommended in the
formulas whose aims are the conclusions.
Definition 7 Let a be an agent with its belief base Ba and
its goals Ga. The formula ϕ ∈ L\LG is U2-useful for a iff
Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga) ≺2 Missing(Ba, Ga). We use the
notation U2Ga,Baϕ or U
2ϕ when there is no ambiguity.
According to this second definition, a formula ϕ of L \LG
is U2-useful for a if knowing ϕ allows a to reduce its
information need either by reducing the amount of mis-
sing conjunctions or by reducing their size. However, the
two previous definitions, based on different pre-orders, are
equivalent as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3
U1ϕ ⇐⇒ U2ϕ.
We will denote by Uϕ the useful information.
Example 2 Example 1 (continued)
Missing(Ba, Ga) = {q, r}. Missing(Ba ∪
{r}, Ga) = {q}. Missing(Ba ∪ {q}, Ga) = {r}.
Missing(Ba ∪ {q ∧ r}, Ga) = ∅. Therefore, Ur, Us and
U(q ∧ r). In addition, if x is a propositional letter of the
language, we have U(r ∧ x) which means that r ∧ x is
useful. Indeed, knowing Python and Java is useful for the
agent because it allows the agent to achieve G2.
The last remark in this example shows a limitation of this
binary model. Indeed, r is useful and so is r ∧ x because,
like r, it reduces the agent’s need for information. Howe-
ver, this could be questionable because r ∧ x contains x,
which does not intervene in reducing the agent’s need for
information. In other words, reading a document on Py-
thon and Java, certainly allows the agent to acquire useful
information about Python to prepare the class, but leads the
agent to read content about Java, not useful for achieving
its goals. This limitation is emphasized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two formulas of L \ LG.
If Uϕ1 then U(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
Some more results are given below.
Proposition 5
— If ϕ is not useful then Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ,Ga) =
Missing(Ba, Ga)
— If ∃ψ ∈ Missing(Ba, Ga) such that ϕ |= ψ then
Uϕ.
— Uϕ 6⇒ Missing(Ba, Ga) |= ϕ
— Missing(Ba, Ga) |= ϕ 6⇒ Uϕ
The first point of this proposition shows that adding un-
necessary information to the agent’s belief base does not
change missing information. The second point shows that
any information that implies missing information is use-
ful. In particular, any missing information is useful. The
reverse is obviously not true. See example 2 : r ∧ x is use-
ful but does not belong to Missing(Ba, Ga). Therefore,
all missing information is useful, but some useful infor-
mation is not missing. The third point illustrates the fact
that useful information is not necessarily a logical conse-
quence of the Missing(Ba, Ga) set. Finally, the fourth
point illustrates the fact that there are logical consequences
of Missing(Ba, Ga) set that are not useful.
4 An Ordinal Approach
In this section we are interested in a notion of relative
usefulness by defining, in two different ways, a pre-order
between the formulas. To compare two formulas ϕ1 and
ϕ2, we compare the two sets of information that is mis-
sing once the piece of information is added to the be-
lief base, i.e., we compare Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ1, Ga) and
Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ2, Ga), by using either of the pre-orders
1 and 2. Here, the obtained definitions will not be equi-
valent (see Example 3).
Definition 8 Let a be an agent, Ba be its belief base and
Ga be its set of goals. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two formulas of
L \ LG. ϕ1 is at least as useful for a as ϕ2, denoted by
ϕ2 1u ϕ1, iff Missing(Ba ∪ϕ1, Ga) 1 Missing(Ba ∪
ϕ2, Ga). ϕ1 is strictly more useful for a than ϕ2, denoted
by ϕ2 ≺1u ϕ1, iff ϕ2 1 ϕ1 and ϕ1 61 ϕ2. Finally, ϕ1
is as useful for a as ϕ2, denoted by ∼1u, iff ϕ2 1u ϕ1 and
ϕ1 1u ϕ2.
According to this definition, if one piece of information
allows to achieve more goals than another, then it is more
useful. If it makes it possible to achieve the same number
of goals but if, for at least one goal, it makes it possible to
reduce missing information, then it is more useful.
Obviously, ϕ2 ≺1u ϕ1 iff Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ1, Ga) ≺1
Missing(Ba ∪ϕ2, Ga) and ϕ2 ∼1u ϕ1 iff Missing(Ba ∪
ϕ1, Ga) = Missing(Ba ∪ ϕ2, Ga). 1u is a pre-order on
all the propositional formulas but not a total pre-order. For
example, in Example 3 below, p ∧ q and p ∧ r are incom-
parable. Indeed Missing(Ba ∪ (p ∧ q), Ga) = {r} and
Missing(Ba ∪ (p ∧ r), Ga) = {q} and {r} 61 {q} and
{q} 61 {r}.
Definition 9 Let a be an agent, Ba be its belief base and
Ga be its set of goals. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two formulas of
L \ LG. ϕ1 is at least as useful for a as ϕ2, denoted by
ϕ2 2u ϕ1, iff Missing(Ba ∪ϕ1, Ga) 2 Missing(Ba ∪
ϕ2, Ga). ϕ1 is strictly more useful for a than ϕ2, denoted
by ϕ2 ≺2u ϕ1, iff ϕ2 2U ϕ1 and ϕ1 62U ϕ2. Finally, ϕ1
is as useful for a as ϕ2, denoted by ∼2u, iff ϕ2 2u ϕ1 and
ϕ1 2u ϕ2.
According to this definition, if one piece of information al-
lows to achieve more goals than another, then it is more
useful. If it achieves the same number of goals and if the
missing information is generally shorter, then it is more
useful.These two definitions are not equivalent as shown
below.
Example 3 Let us suppose that : Ba = {p ∧ q → G1, p ∧
r → G2} and Ga = {G1, G2}. We have for instance,
Missing(Ba ∪ (p∧x), Ga) = {q, r} and Missing(Ba ∪
r,Ga) = {p ∧ q, p}. Thus r ≺2u (p ∧ x) but r 6≺1u (p ∧ x).
Proposition 6 If ψ |= ϕ then ϕ 1U ψ and ϕ 2U ψ.
In particular ϕ1 1U ϕ1∧ϕ2 and ϕ1 2U ϕ1∧ϕ2. That is
to say ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 is at least as useful, in the sense of 1U (and
of2U ) than ϕ1. However, we do not have ϕ1 ≺1U ϕ1∧ϕ2
neither ϕ1 ≺2U ϕ1∧ϕ2 as shown in the previous examples
where p ∼1 p ∧ x and p ∼2 p ∧ x.
5 A Numerical Approach
In this section, we follow a numerical approach by asso-
ciating each piece of information with a usefulness degree.
To begin with, we state some rationality postulates such
a measure must satisfy. The general case will not be trea-
ted, and we will limit ourselves to calculating the degree of
usefulness of conjunctions of positive literals. Let ϕ be a
conjunction of positive literals. We define :
— Cons(Ba, ϕ) = {l literal of L\LG : Ba∪ϕ |= l}
— N1(ϕ) = ΣG∈Ga |Cons(Ba, ϕ) ∩
Missing(Ba, G)}|
— N2(ϕ) = ΣG∈Ga |Missing(Ba, G) \
Cons(Ba, ϕ)|
— N3(ϕ) = |ϕ \ ∪G∈GaMissing(Ba, G)|
Cons(Ba, ϕ) is the set of all the literals that are deducible
after adding ϕ to Ba. N1(ϕ) counts the literals common
to Cons(Ba, ϕ) and to the missing information. The lar-
ger the N1(ϕ), the more ϕ reduces the missing informa-
tion to achieve the goals. N2(ϕ) counts the literals of mis-
sing information that are not in Cons(Ba, ϕ). Notice that
N2(ϕ) = ΣG∈Ga |Missing(Ba, G)| − N1(ϕ). Therefore,
if N1(ϕ) increases, N2(ϕ) decreases. N3(ϕ) counts the li-
terals of ϕ that are not literals of missing information. Ad-
ding them is therefore not useful to achieve the goals.
Let us consider again agent a whose belief base is Ba and
goal set is Ga.
Definition 10 The set of goals that a formula ϕ allows the
agent to achieve is :
EBa,Ga(ϕ) = {G ∈ Ga, Ba 6|= G and Ba ∪ ϕ |= G}
We note E(ϕ) when there is no ambiguity.
Let U(ϕ) be a real representing how much ϕ is useful for
a. We consider the following postulates :
— (P1) |E(ϕ1)| < |E(ϕ2)| =⇒ U(ϕ1) < U(ϕ2)
— (P2) |E(ϕ1)| = |E(ϕ2)| and N1(ϕ1) >
N1(ϕ2) =⇒ U(ϕ1) > U(ϕ2)
— (P3) |E(ϕ1)| = |E(ϕ2)| and N1(ϕ1) = N1(ϕ2)
and N3(ϕ1) < N3(ϕ2) =⇒ U(ϕ1) > U(ϕ2)
— P4 |E(ϕ1)| = |E(ϕ2)| and N1(ϕ1) = N1(ϕ2) and
N3(ϕ1) = N3(ϕ2) =⇒ U(ϕ1) = U(ϕ2)
According to (P1), the higher the number of goals that a
formula makes it possible to achieve, the higher its useful-
ness degree. According to (P2), (P3) and (P4), when two
formulas allow to achieve the same number of goals (whe-
ther the goals are the same, different or even no goals at
all), then the more a formula reduces missing information
the more useful it is. Moreover, in case of equality, the most
useful information is the one which brings the least useless
information ; finally, if they have the same number of use-
less pieces of information, then they have the same useful-
ness degree. These postulates are consistent because their
premises are incompatible.
Notice that, according to these postulates, if N1(ϕ1) =
N1(ϕ2) and N3(ϕ1) = N3(ϕ2) then U(ϕ1) = U(ϕ2).
In the following, we provide the definition of a usefulness
measure U which satisfies these postulates.
Definition 11 Let a be an agent whose goals are in Ga
and let ϕ be a conjunction of positive literals. We define
the usefulness degree 3 by :
U(ϕ) = 1|Ga|+1
[
|E(ϕ)|+ N1(ϕ)
N1(ϕ)+N2(ϕ)+
N3(ϕ)
N3(ϕ)+1
]
The intuitive idea behind this definition is as follows. The
usefulness of information can be seen as a calculation of
the similarity between the information the agent needs to
achieve its goals and the piece of information that arrives.
The more direct or indirect elements (that can be deduced)
3. Such a degree should be noted UBa,Ga (ϕ) but we will note it
U(ϕ) when there is no ambiguity.
there are in common between the two, the more useful the
information will be. We would like to stress that this fact
allows to account for the serendipity factor [Tom00] in the
definition of usefulness. Indeed, an agent gets (asks for)
a piece of information to achieve a given goal, but if the
received piece of information helps also achieving other
goals then this fact is considered in the computation of the
usefulness. However, the number of common elements is
not always enough to distinguish the degrees of usefulness
between two pieces of information. Indeed, in some cases
it would also be necessary to take into account their diffe-
rences. We have been inspired by Tversky’s idea [Tve77],
according to which, in order to calculate the similarity bet-
ween two objectsA andB, we should consider, in addition
to what they have in common, what distinguishes them,
i.e., the features of A which are not features of B and vice-
versa. This is the reason why we have considered these
three values, N1(ϕ), N2(ϕ) and N3(ϕ), in our definition.
Remark 1 We can notice that for any conjunction of posi-
tive literals ϕ we have :
0 ≤ N1(ϕ)
N1(ϕ)+N2(ϕ)+
N3(ϕ)
N3(ϕ)+1
≤ 1.
N1(ϕ)
N1(ϕ)+N2(ϕ)+
N3(ϕ)
N3(ϕ)+1
= 1 =⇒ E(ϕ) = Ga.
Proposition 7 The measure U(ϕ) proposed in Defini-
tion 11 satisfies postulates (P1)–(P4).
Example 4 Let us consider : Ba = {q} ∪ {p ∧ q →
G1, p ∧ r → G2} et Ga = {G1, G2}. We have then
Missing(Ba, Ga) = {p, p ∧ r}. We obtain U(p ∧ r) = 1,
U(p) = 5/6, U(p∧ q) = U(p∧ x) = 11/14, U(r) = 1/6,
U(q∧r) = 1/7,U(q∧x) = U(q) = 0. In other words, p∧r
is the piece of information that has the maximal degree of
usefulness, which is explained by the fact that adding p∧ r
allows to achieve both goals G1 and G2. The usefulness of
p is lower than the usefulness of p ∧ r but it is higher than
those of the other formulas, because adding p allows to
achieve a goal (G1). On the other hand, p∧q, is less useful
than p because of q : the agent already knows q therefore q
is not useful anymore for the agent because not novel. The
same reasoning holds for p ∧ x. Formula r instead is less
useful because it only reduces missing information regar-
ding one single goal. It is easy to understand that q ∧ r is
less useful than r once more because of the unnecessary
information q. Obviously, q and q ∧ x are not useful at all
because they do not help progressing towards a goal.
Proposition 8 If U(ϕ1) = U(ϕ2) then |E(ϕ1)| =
|E(ϕ2)| and N1(ϕ1) = N1(ϕ1), N2(ϕ1) = N2(ϕ1),
N3(ϕ1) = N3(ϕ1).
N1(ϕ) quantifies the useful part of ϕ for the agent, while
N2(ϕ) quantifies the agent’s disappointment (lack of nee-
ded information) towards ϕ and, finally, N3(ϕ) quanti-
fies the disturbance caused to the agent by the unexpec-
ted and unnecessary content of ϕ. Our definition of useful-
ness takes these three aspects into consideration. By this
proposition, the only way two formulas can have the same
usefulness is by having the same values for these three pa-
rameters. This shows that definition 11 does not permit any
compensation : a variation of one of these three values can-
not be compensated by the variation of the others.
Particular Cases
— When Bma = ∅ : In the case where Bma = ∅,
i.e., when the only beliefs of the agent concern the
agent’s needs in terms of information about the way
to achieve its goals, we have : Missing(Ba, G) =
premise(G) and Cons(Ba, ϕ) = ϕ. U(ϕ) can
then be written as :
U(ϕ) = 1|Ga+1| ·
[
|E(ϕ)|+ N1(ϕ)
K+
N3(ϕ)
N3(ϕ)+1
]
with E(ϕ) = {G ∈ Ga, premise(G) ⊆
ϕ}, N1(ϕ) = ΣG∈Ga |ϕ ∩ Premise(G)}|,
K = ΣG∈Ga |premise(G)|, N3(ϕ) = |ϕ \
∪G∈GaPremise(G)|
— When Bma = ∅ and Ga is a singleton : In this
case, the agent has a single goal, G0, and its only
beliefs is the formula which expresses the informa-
tion need for achieving that single goal. U(ϕ) can
then be written as follows :
U(ϕ) = 12 ·
(
n(ϕ) + |ϕ∩premise(G0)||premise(G0)|+ |ϕ\premise(G0)||ϕ\premise(G0)|+1
)
with n(ϕ) = 1 if premise(G0) ⊆ ϕ and n(φ) = 0
otherwise.
Example 5 Take premise(G0) = a ∧ b. Then we
have U(c) = 0, U(a ∧ c) = 1/5, U(a) = 1/4,
U(a∧b∧c) = 9/10, U(a∧b) = 1. In other words,
c is not useful at all because knowing c does not
allow the agent to reach or get closer to its goal.
a∧c is a little more useful, because even if knowing
c is not useful to the agent, knowing a allows it to
get a little closer to its goal. a is more useful than
a∧ c because it does not add unnecessary informa-
tion. a∧ b∧ c is even more useful because even if it
adds unnecessary information, it allows the agent
to achieve its goal. Finally, a ∧ b is the most use-
ful because it allows the agent to reach its goal and
does not add any unnecessary information.
6 An Example of Application to In-
formation Retrieval
In this section, we will first recall some relevance dimen-
sions in information retrieval which have been used in the
literature [dCPDP09] to propose documents to a user (who
now takes the place of what we called “agent” in the above
general framework). We will then compare those dimen-
sions with the usefulness measure we are proposing here.
However, to have a fair comparison, we need to reformu-
late those dimensions in a logical setting [?].
6.1 A Refresher on Relevance Measures
Formally, in the vector space model, a piece of information
or, more generally, a document d, can be represented as a
vector of T elements, d = [w1d, . . . , w|T |d]. The user in-
terests are represented by a vector q = [w1q, . . . , w|T |q],
|T | being the size of the term vocabulary used. Different
choices have been made in the literature regarding the va-
lues of wid, for example : simply based on the presence or
absence of a word in the document, in this case the vec-
tor contains values in {0, 1}, or based on the frequency of
the word in the document and in the whole repository (TF-
IDF) [BR11]. Here, we will consider the three relevance
dimensions used in [dCPDP09].
Aboutness The measure of aboutness (topical relevance)
is calculated by the standard cosine-similarity [SM84] :
Aboutness(d, q) =
∑|T |
i=1(wiq.wid)√∑|T |
i=1 w
2
iq .
∑|T |
i=1 w
2
id
. (1)
Coverage The coverage criterion measures how strongly
the user interests are included in a document [PBV07].
Coverage(d, q) =
∑|T |
i=1 min(wiq, wid)∑|T |
i=1 wiq
. (2)
This function produces the maximum value 1 when the non
null elements in q’s vector also belong to d’s vector. It pro-
duces the value zero when the two vectors have no common
element. Moreover, the value of the function increases with
the increase of the number of common elements.
Appropriateness This dimension allows to measure how
appropriate or how seemly a document is with respect to
the user interests [dCPDP09].
Appropriateness(d, q) = 1−
∑|T |
i=1 |wiq − wid|
|T | . (3)
According to this definition, a piece of information is
considered fully appropriate if it covers all the user inter-
ests. However, if in addition it covers other subjects, it is
considered less appropriate.
6.2 Reformulation in Logic
We can consider a user query in information retrieval as
the information need associated to a goal. This way, the
premise of the goal can be represented by a formula. Let ϕ
and ψ be two conjunctions of positive literals of a proposi-
tional language. We have :
Aboutness(ϕ,ψ)) = |ϕ∩ψ|√|ϕ| . |ψ| ,
Coverage(ϕ,ψ) = |ϕ∩ψ||ψ| ,
Appropriateness(ϕ,ψ) = 1− |ϕ\ψ|+|ψ\ϕ||L| .
After replacing the premises of the agent’s goal by the for-
mula ψ, the measure defined in definition 11 is then re-
written as follows :
U(ϕ,ψ) = 12 ·
(
n(ϕ) + |ϕ∩ψ||ψ|+ |ϕ\ψ||ϕ\ψ|+1
)
with n(ϕ) = 1 if ψ ⊆ ϕ and n(φ) = 0 otherwise.
More precisely, we consider a propositional language L
that has |T | propositional letters p1 . . . p|T | and a letter
G0 representing the goal of the user. A document d can
then be represented by a formula noted ϕd defined as :
ϕd =
∧
i=1,...,|T | and wi,d=1 pi. A query q can also be
represented by a formula noted premise(G0) defined by
ψq =
∧
i=1,...,|T | and wi,q=1 pi.
The following proposition allows us to reformulate in logic
the three IR measures we have considered from the litera-
ture.
Proposition 9
Aboutness(d, q) = Aboutness(ϕd, ψq)
Coverage(d, q) = Coverage(ϕd, ψq)
Appropriateness(d, q) = Appropriateness(ϕd, ψq)
Example 6 Let us consider again Example 5, with the
propositional language whose letters are a, b, c and G0.
ψ = a ∧ b and let us consider the five formulas : ϕ1 = c,
ϕ2 = a ∧ c, ϕ3 = a, ϕ4 = a ∧ b ∧ c, and ϕ5 = a ∧ b. The
following table summarizes the values of the four measure-
ments.
ϕ About Cov Approp U
ϕ1 = c 0 0 0 0
ϕ2 = a ∧ c 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/5
ϕ3 = a
1√
2
1/2 2/3 1/4
ϕ4 = a ∧ b ∧ c 2√
6
1 2/3 9/10
ϕ5 = a ∧ b 1 1 1 1
A number of observations emerge from these results.
First of all, we notice that two formulas can have
identical degrees of coverage without their degrees of
usefulness being identical. Thus, Coverage(ϕ2) =
Coverage(ϕ3) but U(ϕ2) 6= U(ϕ3). Similarly, two for-
mulas may have identical degrees of appropriateness wi-
thout their degrees of usefulness being identical. Thus,
Appropriatemess(ϕ3) = Appropriateness(ϕ4) but
U(ϕ3) 6= U(ϕ4). We also notice that a and a ∧ b ∧ c have
identical appropriateness values although for different rea-
sons : appriopriateness(a) = 2/3 because a says no-
thing about b, whereas this is part of the user’s information
need, and appriopriateness(a ∧ b ∧ c) = 2/3 because
a ∧ b ∧ c, although providing all the information the user
need to achieve his/her goal, it provides unnecessary infor-
mation, c. On the other hand, these different reasons lead
to different degrees of usefulness and, in particular, U(a)
is much lower than U(a ∧ b ∧ c). Indeed, by definition, U
favors information that allows the user need to be satisfied
(this is fully the case with a∧b∧c whereas it is partially the
case with a). Even if a ∧ b ∧ c provides unnecessary infor-
mation, namely c, the user will be able to achieve his/her
goal with it, unlike with a.
The following proposition provides some comparisons bet-
ween the U measure and the IR ones.
Proposition 10 Let ϕ and ψ be two conjunctions of lite-
rals.
— U(ϕ,ψ) = Aboutness(ϕ,ψ) =
Appropriateness(ϕ,ψ) = 1⇐⇒ ϕ = ψ.
— Coverage(ϕ,ψ) = 1⇐⇒ ψ ⊆ ϕ.
— U(ϕ,ψ) = Aboutness(ϕ,ψ) =
Appropriateness(ϕ,ψ) = Coverage(ϕ,ψ) =
0⇐⇒ ϕ ∩ ψ = ∅.
— Coverage(ϕ1, ψ) < Coverage(ϕ2, ψ) =⇒
U(ϕ1, ψ) < U(ϕ2, ψ)
— Appropriateness(ϕ1, ψ) ≤
Appropriateness(ϕ2, ψ) and Coverage(ϕ1, ψ) =
Coverage(ϕ2, ψ) =⇒ U(ϕ1, ψ) ≤ U(ϕ2, ψ).
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed three approches to define the notion of
usefulness for a cognitive agent. A binary approach, which
allows to classify a piece of information as being useful or
not. An ordinal approach, which allows to compare two
pieces of information in order to establish which one is
more useful. Two different operators have been proposed in
this case : a pre-order operator and a total order operator.
However, and like for the binary approach, the proposed
ordinal approach does not allow to consider unnecessary
information. This is accounted for by the third approach
by means of a numerical definition of usefulness. We have
compared, through an easy to understand example, three
IR measures from the literature with our numerical mea-
sure. The results of the comparision show that our numeri-
cal definition of usefulness, based on the cognitive aspects
of the user, allows to capture in a single value different di-
mensions, without the need for eliciting an explicit prio-
rity order on the dimensions from the user. In addition, it
allows to somehow account for the seredipity factor (see
Example 4). Moreover, it also allows to account for no-
velty with respect to the user’s beliefs, not only with res-
pect to the past user interactions as usual in the literature
(see again Example 4, in which the fact that a piece of in-
formation contains information already known by the user
diminishes its usefulness).
An application of our framework that would be interesting
to investigate is its use to reduce the needs to coordinate
multiple assistive agents advising the same user [STK19].
Other possible applications would be in the case of the In-
formation Flow Problem in multi-agent systems, in which
there is a need to ensure an adequate exchange of informa-
tion within a system [BTJGF18], and in the case of BDI
personal medical assistant agents, where one critical requi-
rement is to (automatically) produce an accurate documen-
tation [CMR+18]. We also plan to extend our framework
to allow the calculation of usefulness for more general for-
mulas.
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